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Abstract  Use of the cloud clearly brings with it major privacy concerns.  Whilst a 
range of technical solutions, including use of one of the many variants of homo-
morphic encryption, potentially enable these concerns to be addressed, in practice 
such complex privacy enhancing technologies are not widely used.  Instead, cloud 
users, including both individuals and organisations, rely in practice on contractual 
agreements to help ensure that Personally Identifiable Information (PII) stored in 
the cloud is handled appropriately.  This contractual approach builds on compli-
ance, a widely used notion in information security.  Specifically, cloud service 
providers obtain certification of compliance to appropriate security standards and 
guidelines, notably the ISO/IEC 27000 series, to prove they provide a secure ser-
vice.  To provide privacy guarantees, a standard, ISO/IEC 27018:2014, has recent-
ly been published specifically aimed at enabling cloud service vendors to show 
compliance with regulations and laws governing the handling of PII.  This is just 
the first in an emerging series of standards providing guidelines on cloud security 
and privacy, as well as more general PII handling in IT systems.  This paper re-
views the state of the art in such standards, and also looks forward to areas where 
further standards and guidelines are needed, including discussing the issues that 
they need to address. 
1 Introduction 
Almost by definition storing and processing data in the cloud bring major secu-
rity and privacy concerns, over and above those that apply in any environment 
where sensitive data is processed.  That is, except in the case of a private cloud, 
owned and operated by the data owner, use of the cloud involves passing control 
over that data to the organisation providing the cloud service. 
From the privacy perspective, a key issue is how PII is handled by the cloud 
service provider.  Indeed, in many jurisdictions the client of the cloud service will 
have legal responsibilities governing the handling of PII, and these responsibilities 
2  
will extend to ensuring that the PII is handled appropriately by any cloud service 
provider. 
To make the nature of these responsibilities a little clearer, we introduce some 
terminology (all taken from ISO/IEC 29100, [14]).  Personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) is ‘any information that (a) can be used to identify the PII principal to 
whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked 
to a PII principal’.  A PII principal is a ‘natural person to whom the personally 
identifiable information (PII) relates’.  A PII controller is a ‘privacy stakeholder 
(or privacy stakeholders) that determines the purposes and means for processing 
PII other than natural persons who use data for personal purposes’.  A PII proces-
sor is a ‘privacy stakeholder that processes PII on behalf of and in accordance 
with the instructions of a PII controller’.  Using this terminology, the PII control-
ler has legal responsibilities governing the processing of the PII it controls, and 
these extend to ensuring that any PII processors it appoints (such as cloud service 
providers) process PII in accordance with the law. 
There is a range of ways in which a PII controller could try to meet its obliga-
tions regarding the protection of PII.  One approach would be to avoid any use of 
the cloud, and retain control of all PII storage and processing ‘in house’.  Howev-
er, as has been widely discussed, many advantages arise from the use of the cloud, 
and so we take it as read for the purposes of this chapter that the PII controller 
wishes to transfer PII to a cloud provider for storage and processing.  In this con-
text, one approach would be to encrypt all PII before transfer to the cloud, and to 
only decrypt it when it is retrieved from the cloud.  However, with conventional 
encryption techniques, this would prevent the cloud provider doing anything but 
storing the data, which again limits the usefulness of the cloud.  A more sophisti-
cated encryption technique known as homomorphic encryption seeks to solve this 
problem (see, for example, [21]).  An encryption technique that is homomorphic 
with respect to the operator  is one which has the property that, for a given key K, 
the encryption function E satisfies E(xy) = E(x)E(y), for all x and y.  Schemes 
have been devised that are homomorphic for a range of operation types, the goal 
being to find a scheme which is homomorphic with respect to a set of operations 
capturing the types of processing likely to be required of a cloud provider.  This 
would then enable the cloud provider to process the data in encrypted form, i.e. so 
that the cloud provider is able to process data but learns nothing about the data be-
ing processed.  However, despite huge progress in developing schemes of this type 
in recent years, the available algorithms remain too computationally complex for 
routine deployment.  This means that, in practice, we must find non-technical 
means to protect remotely processed PII, which leads to the compliance approach, 
i.e. where the PII controller seeks to be assured about the deployed security 
measures and privacy practices of the cloud PII processor. 
In this chapter we look at how standards are being developed covering the po-
tentially complex relationship between the PII controller and the PII processor.  
More specifically, how can PII controllers know whether or not PII processors 
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will handle PII appropriately, how can PII processors ensure that they meet their 
obligations to PII controllers, and how can standards help with this? 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  In the next section we 
review the compliance approach, and existing standards directed specifically at PII 
processing issues.  This is followed by an examination of standards currently be-
ing developed in this area.  Before concluding we look briefly at possible future 
topics for standardisation in this key area. 
2 Compliance – the state of the art 
We start by discussing what we mean here by compliance.  This necessitates 
taking a somewhat broader perspective of security management before we return 
to looking at cloud security and privacy issues in particular.  The compliance ap-
proach we refer to here is essentially an approach to security management that in-
volves setting up a standards-compliant security management system, and then be-
ing audited against compliance with the standards.  If the audit is successful, the 
resulting certification can be used to give third parties confidence that security 
management is being performed in accordance with accepted norms and practices, 
as well, of course, as giving the organisation itself confidence that its security 
management is in accordance with the state of the art. 
Such a compliance approach is widely adopted across industry, commerce and 
government.  The main advantage of such an approach is that it disseminates good 
practice, and encourages the universal adoption of an agreed baseline for IT secu-
rity.  The main disadvantage, as has been widely documented in the literature (see, 
for example, [5], [20]), is that it encourages a slavish box-ticking approach to se-
curity, where minimal safeguards are put in place without appropriate ongoing 
management and organisation-wide buy-in.  However, it could be argued that 
most of the criticisms are not of the approach itself, but of the way it is imple-
mented, and that organisations which do not implement the standardised approach 
well would not implement any other approach to security very well either.  It is 
certainly the case that without careful and considered adoption, any approach to IT 
security will fail, whether it is the compliance-led approach or some other ad hoc 
scheme.  In any event, to a first approximation the compliance approach is the on-
ly show in town: it is what we have and it is what is being implemented, and hence 
it is worth taking very seriously (and enhancing, wherever possible). 
The leading contender for such a standards-based approach is based on the 
ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards.  According to ISO/IEC 27000, [9], an Infor-
mation Security Management System (ISMS) consists of the policies, procedures, 
guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an or-
ganisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.  An ISMS is a sys-
tematic approach for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, review-
ing, maintaining and improving an organisation’s information security to achieve 
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business objectives.  It is based upon a risk assessment and the organisation’s risk 
acceptance levels designed to effectively treat and manage risks.  Analysing re-
quirements for the protection of information assets and applying appropriate con-
trols to ensure the protection of these information assets, as required, contributes 
to the successful implementation of an ISMS’.  As well as defining the concept of 
an ISMS, ISO/IEC 27000 [9] provides a comprehensive set of related terminolo-
gy. 
In doing so, ISO/IEC 27000 provides the foundation for ISO/IEC 27001, [10], 
the heart of the ISO/IEC 27000 series.  According to its scope statement, ISO/IEC 
27001 ‘specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and 
continually improving an ISMS within the context of the organisation.  … [It] also 
includes requirements for the assessment and treatment of information security 
risks tailored to the needs of the organisation.  The requirements … are generic 
and are intended to be applicable to all organisations, regardless of type, size or 
nature’.  In other words, ISO/IEC 27001 describes what is needed to create and 
operate an ISMS. 
Application of ISO/IEC 27001 is supported by perhaps the best known of these 
standards, namely ISO/IEC 27002, [11].  ISO/IEC 27002 provides a catalogue of 
security controls, i.e. measures that can be implemented by an organisation to ad-
dress identified security risks, and associated implementation guidance.  This 
comprehensive set of controls has a long history and has been revised and expand-
ed over time – with origins in a British standard (BS 7799, [1], which became BS 
7799-1, [2]) first published in the mid-1990s.  In passing we note that ISO/IEC 
27001 is also derived from a British standard, namely BS 7799-2, [3], [4]. 
The controls in ISO/IEC 27002 are organised into 14 categories, covering top-
ics such as information security policies (clause 5), human resource security 
(clause 7), asset management (clause 8), access control (clause 9), supplier rela-
tionships (clause 15), and compliance (clause 18).  Within each clause a number 
of control objectives are defined; there are a total of 35 such objectives.  For ex-
ample, clause 18.1, entitled Compliance with legal and contractual requirements, 
gives the objective ‘To avoid breaches of legal, statutory, regulatory or contractual 
obligations related to information security objectives’.  Under each objective are 
one or more detailed controls, typically with extensive accompanying implementa-
tion guidance, which can be deployed to help meet the objective.  There are over 
100 such controls, ranging from Monitoring and review of supplier services (‘Or-
ganisations should regularly monitor, review and audit supplier service delivery’: 
clause 15.1.2) to Regulation of cryptographic controls (‘Cryptographic controls 
should be used in compliance with all relevant agreements, legislation and regula-
tions’: clause 18.1.5). 
The set of controls in ISO/IEC 27002 is intended as a guide to the designers of 
an ISMS.  That is, it is certainly not mandated for any organisation using the 
ISO/IEC 27001 approach to adopt all the controls given in ISO/IEC 27002; indeed 
the intention is that the risk analysis performed as part of setting up the ISMS 
should consider the appropriateness of the controls in the catalogue, and adopt 
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(only) those that are necessary to address the identified risks.  Nevertheless, many 
of the controls are so fundamental that it is hard to imagine IT systems which do 
not need their adoption to ensure reasonable levels of security. 
Returning to the focus on privacy, it merits note that one of the controls in 
ISO/IEC 27002 (in clause 18.1.4) is entitled Privacy and protection of personally 
identifiable information, and specifies that ‘Privacy and protection of personally 
identifiable information should be ensured as required in relevant legislation and 
regulation where applicable’.  The associated implementation guidance is very 
general, starting by stating that ‘An organization’s data policy for privacy and pro-
tection of personally identifiable information should be developed and implement-
ed.  This policy should be communicated to all persons involved in the processing 
of personally identifiable information’.  It goes on to discuss the need for a priva-
cy policy and also the potential need for a nominated officer in an organisation to 
manage privacy issues. 
This leads naturally to a discussion of ISO//IEC 27018, [13].  This standard is 
focussed specifically on PII protection when it is processed in the cloud – more 
specifically when the processing is performed by a public cloud service provider.  
It provides a set of controls, supplementing ISO/IEC 27002, aimed at cloud ser-
vice providers who act as PII processors on behalf of a PII controller.  That is, the 
main focus of the standard is not those cloud service providers which act as PII 
controllers, although the controls in ISO/IEC 27018 will almost certainly apply to 
such entities (as well as many other controls besides, e.g. as given in the emerging 
standards ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/IEC 29151 – see below). 
The idea behind ISO/IEC 27018 is that a cloud service provider can have its 
ISMS audited using the ISO/IEC 27001 system, where the auditor will verify that 
the risk management process and subsequent ISMS implementation has properly 
taken into account the supplementary set of controls in ISO/IEC 27018.  The certi-
fication resulting can then be used to both inform prospective users of the privacy-
respecting properties of the cloud service, and also become part of the relevant 
contractual arrangements when the cloud service is used.  It is hoped that this will 
greatly simplify the task of the PII controller when selecting a cloud service pro-
vider. 
The set of controls in the standard was derived from a range of sources.  Prior 
to producing the first draft of ISO/IEC 27018, an extensive analysis was per-
formed of existing law relating to the third party processing of PII.  The main re-
sult of this analysis was a set of 70 controls, which were documented in the origi-
nal proposal to start work on the standard, published in November 2011, [16].  
Only those not already covered in ISO/IEC 27002 were included in the subsequent 
working drafts of the standard.  In July 2012, the European Union published an 
important review of cloud computing privacy issues, [6].  This was carefully ana-
lysed, along with other published opinions, and used to derive a number of addi-
tional controls which were included in the second working draft of December 
2012, [17].  During 2013 additional input was received from a number of parties, 
and used to shape the final document published in 2014, [13]. 
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The scope of ISO/IEC 27018 was kept deliberately tight for two main reasons.  
Firstly, those of us responsible for its development believed it was important to try 
to publish the standard quickly, and limiting the scope makes rapid progress much 
simpler.  Secondly, the focus of the standard, namely cloud service providers pro-
cessing PII on behalf of the PII controller, was believed to be particularly im-
portant, and hence focussing on this subject made practical sense.  Both these mo-
tivations appear to have been borne out by experience – the interval between the 
new work item proposal and publication of a completed standard was a little over 
30 months, which is virtually as short a period as is possible within ISO/IEC SC 
27, and the standard has rapidly become a ‘best seller’, at least in the context of 
ISO/IEC1! 
Of course ISO/IEC 27000, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002 and ISO/IEC 
27018 are only four of a major series of standards known collectively as the 27000 
series.  Some standards in the series seek to expand upon particular topics ad-
dressed within ISO/IEC 27001, including: 
 ISO/IEC 27003: Implementation guidance, giving more details on the 
implementation of an ISMS; 
 ISO/IEC 27004: Measurement, covering security metrics; 
 ISO/IEC 27005: Information security risk management; and 
 ISO/IEC 27006: Requirements for bodies providing audit and certifi-
cation of information security management systems, setting out how 
certification of ISMSs against ISO/IEC 27001 should be carried out. 
Other 27000 series standards, like ISO/IEC 27018, act as a supplement to 
ISO/IEC 27002, providing an additional set of controls and accompanying guid-
ance for a specific application domain, including: 
 ISO/IEC 27011: Information security management guidelines for tel-
ecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002. 
Note that all these standards are available for purchase from ISO 
(www.iso.org), IEC (www.iec.ch), and also from national standards organisations 
such as BSI in the UK (www.bsigroup.com). 
Whilst mentioning existing standards of relevance to privacy in the cloud, brief 
mention should also be given to ISO/IEC 29100, [14], the Privacy framework.  
This standard was published back in 2011, and provides a set of eleven privacy 
principles (Consent and choice; Purpose legitimacy and specification; Collection 
limitation; Data minimisation; Use, retention and disclosure limitation; Accuracy 
and quality; Openness, transparency and notice; Individual participation and ac-
cess; Accountability; Information security; and Privacy compliance).  These prin-
ciples were used to inform and motivate the supplementary control set given in 
                                                          
1 For example, ISO/IEC 27018 was listed at number 7 in the April 2015 list of 
best-selling ISO standards, as published by the Singapore standards organisation – 
see http://www.singaporestandardseshop.sg/ISOStandards/BestSellingISOStandards.aspx 
(checked on 9th June 2015). 
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ISO/IEC 27018.  Indeed, the ISO/IEC 27018 supplementary controls are organised 
according to the eleven privacy principles. 
3 Compliance – emerging standards 
ISO/IEC 27018 was published in mid-2014.  Two other standards directly rele-
vant to cloud privacy, and with somewhat larger scopes, are currently under de-
velopment.  Both ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/EC 29151, like ISO/IEC 27018, aim to 
provide a set of controls and associated implementation guidance aimed to sup-
plement those given in ISO/IEC 27002 for a specific application domain.  In some 
sense both of these emerging standards have the focus of ISO/IEC 27018 as a sub-
set. 
ISO/IEC 27017, which is nearing completion (as of mid-2015 it was at the Fi-
nal Draft International Standard stage, [12], the last stage before publication), aims 
to enhance the set of controls in ISO/IEC 27002 to cover all the security and pri-
vacy aspects of operating a cloud service.  As stated in the introduction, it ‘pro-
vides guidelines supporting the implementation of information security controls 
for cloud service customers and cloud service providers.  Many of the guidelines 
guide the cloud service providers to assist the cloud service customers in imple-
menting the controls, and guide the cloud service customers to implement such 
controls.  Selection of appropriate information security controls, and the applica-
tion of the implementation guidance provided, will depend on a risk assessment as 
well as any legal, contractual, regulatory or other cloud-sector specific information 
security requirements’. 
The current draft of ISO/IEC 27017, [12], is, as one might expect, much larger 
than ISO/IEC 27018; indeed, it is something like half the length of ISO/IEC 27002 
itself.  It incorporates controls and guidance derived from a wide range of sources 
including standards and reports from Australia, Hong Kong, the US (including 
NIST), Singapore, the Cloud Security Alliance, ENISA and ISACA.  It looks set 
to be published in late 2015 or early 2016. 
A somewhat complementary focus applies to the development of ISO/IEC 
29151, which as of mid-2015 has just reached the committee draft stage, [15].  
ISO/IEC 29151 aims to document controls relevant to the protection of PII no 
matter where it is stored and which entity acts as the PII processor or controller.  
As it states in the introduction ‘The number of organisations processing PII is in-
creasing, as is the amount of PII that these organisations deal with.  At the same 
time, the societal expectation for the protection of PII and the security of data re-
lating to the individuals is also increasing.  A number of countries are augmenting 
their laws to address the increased number of high profile breaches.  As the num-
ber of PII breaches increase, organisations controlling or processing PII, including 
smaller newcomers (e.g. small and medium enterprises (SMEs)) will increasingly 
need guidance on how they should protect PII in order to reduce the risk of priva-
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cy breaches occurring, and to reduce the impact of breaches on the organisation 
and on the individuals concerned.  This document provides such guidance’. 
The current draft is again an extensive document, and builds on a wide variety 
of sources.  At the current rate of development, publication is likely no earlier than 
2017. 
We conclude by providing in Table 1 a summary of the current and emerging 
standards of relevance to privacy compliance in the cloud. 
Table 1.  Summary of cloud-privacy-relevant ISO/IEC standards 
Standard Title and scope 
ISO/IEC 27000:2014 Information security management systems – Overview and vocabulary 
Sets the scene for the ISO/IEC 27000 series 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Information security management systems – Requirements 
Defines general principles for an information security management sys-
tem, including how an ISMS should be established and run – it is the 
foundation of the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards 
ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information security management systems – Code of practice for infor-
mation security controls 
Provides a catalogue of generally applicable security controls, to be used 
as part of an ISMS as defined in ISO/IEC 27001 
ISO/IEC FDIS 27017 
(2015) 
Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 
27002 for cloud services 
Provides supplementary information for ISO/IEC 27002 controls and a set 
of new controls aimed specifically at the cloud (a superset of ISO/IEC 
27018) 
ISO/IEC 27018:2014 Code of practice for protection of PII in public clouds acting as PII pro-
cessors 
Provides supplementary information for ISO/IEC 27002 controls and a set 
of new controls aimed specifically at cloud providers processing PII on 
behalf of a PII controller 
ISO/IEC 29100 Privacy framework 
Lays down a general set of privacy principles for information storage and 
processing 
ISO/IEC CD 29151 
(2015) 
Code of practice for PII protection 
Provides supplementary information for ISO/IEC 27002 controls and a set 
of new controls aimed at all processing and storage of PII (a superset of 
ISO/IEC 27018) 
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4 Compliance – future work 
Even when ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/IEC 29151 are completed and in use, the 
work on standards governing cloud privacy will not come to an end.  Apart from 
anything else, all the standards we have discussed are subject to a continuing pro-
cess of review and, where necessary, improvement.  There are also further areas 
where standards guidance is needed. 
One such area is that of data de-identification, i.e. the processing of PII so that 
it is no longer linked to a particular individual.  Organisations processing PII, in-
cluding cloud service providers, are required to comply with the applicable priva-
cy-enforcing regulations and laws, which often prevents processing of personal 
data for purposes other than those for which the data was originally collected.  Da-
ta de-identification techniques (e.g. pseudonymisation or anonymisation) are 
widely used as a way of enabling the re-use of large data sets to extract otherwise 
hidden information (so called big data) without endangering user privacy.  Such 
an approach is viable since in many cases the value of processing is maintained 
even if PII principals are no longer identifiable, directly or indirectly, either by the 
organisation alone as PII controller or in collaboration with any other party.  Addi-
tionally, it may be permissible for an organisation to process data for purposes 
other than those for which the PII principals had given their consent, as long as the 
data has been rendered into a form in which identification of the PII principals is 
no longer reasonably feasible, taking into account the state of the art and the or-
ganisation’s context.  That is, de-identification techniques are tools that may ena-
ble the wide range of potential benefits arising from data processing to be main-
tained, whilst respecting privacy regulations and laws. 
However, such data de-identification techniques need to be used with great 
care, not least because of the risk of data re-identification, in which, using contex-
tual or other information, the data can be linked back to an individual.  Organisa-
tions proposing to use de-identification must therefore carefully define the de-
identification measures that are appropriate in their context in order to ensure re-
sults that are sufficiently robust given the risks of re-identification.  As such it will 
be extremely helpful to end user organisations, notably the many cloud service 
providers holding large data sets containing PII, to provide a detailed and practical 
description of these techniques, including their strengths and weaknesses. 
This is an increasingly pressing issue since, in organisations of many types, the 
amount of data created and potentially being used continues to increase, as do the 
capabilities of data analytics.  Furthermore, the state of the art shows (see, for ex-
ample, [19]) that achieving robustness in de-identification processes is far from 
trivial.  There is thus a need for a standard that will help organisations in defining 
and reviewing their processes according to the state of the art and their environ-
ment, including their regulatory context.  Such a standard would also enable or-
ganisations to build trust with a variety of stakeholders (including PII principals, 
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customers, and data protection agencies) and to establish a common language for 
transparency regarding their processes. 
At its May 2015 meeting in Kuching, WG 5 of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 (the 
standards committee responsible for ISO/IEC 27018 and ISO/IEC 29151) agreed 
to issue a new work item proposal, [18], to create a standard covering data de-
identification techniques to address this growing need.  The proposed standard 
will provide information to organisations which aim to use de-identification tech-
niques, with the goal of creating awareness of typical characteristics to consider 
and to help them avoid common pitfalls. 
The new work item proposal, [18], has an attached preliminary working draft, 
which draws extensively on a recent Article 29 Working Party report, [7].  Apart 
from a comprehensive set of definitions of terminology, intended to enable unam-
biguous discussions of de-identification, the new standard is expected to contain 
clauses covering the usability of de-identified data, the risks of re-identification, 
techniques for pseudonymisation, and techniques for achieving and metrics for 
measuring anonymisation.  It will also draw on an existing health-sector-specific 
ISO technical specification on pseudonymisation [8]. 
5 How effective is the compliance model? 
As already discussed, the compliance model has been widely criticised, not least 
for encouraging a ‘box-ticking mentality’.  However, without doubt ISO/IEC 
27002 (and its predecessors) has done much to inform organisations of the funda-
mental techniques of information security management.  For better or worse it 
would appear that use of the 27000 series standards is considered as a fundamental 
part of security management for almost every large organisation, at least in the 
western world. 
One could reasonably ask critics of the compliance approach whether they 
would rather employ a cloud service provider which has verified that its security 
and privacy practices conform to the state of the art or one which has not.  It 
seems hard to argue in favour of the latter.  Indeed, the author is not aware of any 
research calling for routine security management measures to be abandoned; in-
stead, what seems to be needed are better ways of managing the human side of se-
curity management.  The compliance approach is still evolving, and there is clear-
ly no cause for complacency.  Ultimately there is no replacement for good 
management practices, both within IT and more broadly, and the 27000 series 
standards are just one part of the overall information security solution. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
We have attempted to review both recently published and emerging interna-
tional standards of relevance to privacy, and in particular PII protection, in the 
cloud.  ISO/IEC 27018 has made a significant in the short period since it was pub-
lished, and will be joined in the near future by ISO/IEC 27017, and, later on, by 
ISO/IEC 29151.  In the longer term future, it is hoped that we will see the devel-
opment of detailed guidance on de-identification techniques, enabling greater con-
fidence that data collected through the provision of cloud services is used for 
greater societal benefit in ways which respect end user privacy. 
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